NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN
NEW JERSEY: CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
INTRODUCTION

The concept of no-fault is not a new one in the field of tort law.
Its principles abound in the social legislation Wvhich is epitomized by
the workmen's compensation acts.' A review of the historical background
of the no-fault principle indicates that the first commentary concerning
this impending crisis in the area of tort law appeared in the 1914'
edition of the Harvard Law Review, shortly after the first workmen's
compensation act was enacted. In a two-part article entitled "Sequel
to Workmen's Compensation Acts," 2 a Harvard Law School professor
expressed his concern with the irreconcilability of the workmen's
compensation act and the fault principles of common law.3 The author
reasoned that tort law should either regress back to the fifteenth-century
concept of strict liability, or the workmen's compensation acts should
be repealed. 4 The initial objections to workmen's compensation
legislation, which resulted in much litigation over its constitutionality,
subsided during the twenties, and this new concept eventually became
an established principle in modem society.5 However in 1932, renewed
1 At common law a worker faced almost insurmountable barriers to recovery, for
work related injuries. In Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837), the defenses
of fellow servant and assumption of the risk were first encountered. These two concepts
were adopted by American courts, led by the Massachusetts case of Farwell v. Boston &
Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). Another employer defense, contributory negligence, was first recognized in Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
With these defenses fully recognized by the majority of courts, little remained of the
employer's liability to his employees for work related injuries. Early German statistics,
which are detailed and therefore helpful, reveal the following breakdown of employee
accidents:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Negligence or fault of employer
Joint negligence of employer and injured employee
Negligence of fellow servant
Acts of God
Fault or negligence of the injured employee
Inevitable accidents connected with the employment

16.81%
4.66
5.28
2.31
28.89
42.05

1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 4.30 (1968).
Recognizing the inequity of a system which allowed less than 17% of the injured
employees to collect damages, various states enacted the workmen's compensation system.
2 Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts (pts. 1 & 2) 27 H~Aiv. L. REv. 235,

344 (1914).
3 Id. at 368.
4 Id.
5 In New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), the Court upheld the con-
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pressure for reform of the tort system appeared and this time focused
on the ailing automobile compensation system, with its concurrent
reliance on fault principles. The Columbia Report0 presented the first
comprehensive study of the automobile accident system, with a recommendation that a workmen's compensation-type scheme be adopted
which would correct the systemic ills of the accident reparations
industry. Specifically, the recommendation suggested that compensation
for medical expenses should be made on a first party no-fault basis.7 The
proposal further included wage loss compensation of $25 per week with
a maximum of $5,0008 and a $3,500 maximum allowance for disfigurement. 9 There was no provision for reimbursement of property losses.
The plan was considered in New York, Connecticut, Wisconsin and
Virginia, but was never adopted. However, its dramatic emphasis of
the critical need for reform, reflected by the widespread shortage of
liability insurance, was instrumental in increasing the availability and
coverage of automobiles with casualty insurance. 10
While the period following the presentation of the Columbia
Report was not characterized by a public or legislative outcry for
socialization of the automobile insurance industry, academicians produced several articles dealing with the devastating effects of the reparations system upon the accident victim, and advocated the adoption of
a faultless system.'1 In 1965, Professors Robert E. Keeton and Jeffrey
O'Connell published a book entitled Basic Protection for the Traffic
stitutionality of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law. Concerning the issue of
freedom of contract, Mr. Justice Pitney, writing for the Court, observed:
[W]e recognize that the legislation under review does measurably limit the freedom of employer and employee to agree respecting the terms of employment, and
that it cannot be supported except on the ground that it is a reasonable exercise
of the police power of the State. In our opinion it is fairly supportable upon that
ground.
Id. at 206. In Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 84 N.J.L. 85, 86 A. 451 (Sup. Ct. 1913), af'd,
86 N.J.L. 701, 91 A. 1070 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914), the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act.
6 COLUMBIA UNrVERsrY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE
COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AuToMoBILE ACCmETS

(1932) [hereinafter cited

as COLUMBIA REPORT].

Id. at 138-40.
8 Id. at 140-42.
9 Id.
10 Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM. L.
REv. 300, 317-20 (1950).
11 A. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRArIC Victim (1954); L. GREEN,
TRAFFICVICTIMs: TORT LAw AND INSURANCE (1958); Green, Automobile Accident Insurance
Legislation in the Province of Saskatchewan, 31 J. COMP. LEG. & INT'L L. 39 (3d ser. 1949);
Kaye & Breslow, Legislation to Replace Adjudication-Planned Compensation for Auto
Accident Victims, 35 B.U.L. REv. 488 (1955).
7
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Victim,' 2 and no-fault entered the twentieth century. Overnight, nofault became a national political issue and Professors Keeton and
O'Connell became the "fathers" of the reform movement. Legal scholars,
practicing attorneys, insurance executives, newspaper reporters, and
legislators have actively debated the merits of the plan,' 3 while independent pollsters have conducted research studies concerning the
4
public's attitude toward this new concept.'
Of the numerous proposals for change in the area of automobile
negligence law, the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan has attracted the most attention. This notoriety can be attributed to the many
public appearances made by the authors, the number of articles written
by them emphasizing the virtues of no-fault,18 and the fact that they
were the first to draft their plan in a comprehensive package which
could be easily adopted by state legislatures."6 Essentially, the plan
provides that for automobile personal injury cases where the net economic loss exceeds $100 but is less than $10,000, the principles of tort
law shall no longer apply.17 The plan also establishes a threshold
amount for pain and suffering: any claim for pain and suffering which
does not exceed $5,000 is not actionable.' 8 Each driver-owner of a
motor vehicle is required to purchase "basic protection" insurance
12 R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIc VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965)

[hereinafter cited as BAsIc PROTECTION].

18 Selected Bibliography on Automobile Insurance Reform Plans, 23 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 197 (1968), lists 242 books and articles written about various no-fault plans,
of which 60 relate directly to the Keeton-O'Connell Plan. Id. at 205-07. For studies printed
after the compilation of above bibliography, see King, The Insurance Industry and Compensation Plans, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1137 (1968); O'Connell, A ,Balanced Approach to Auto
Insurance Reform: O'Connell Answers His Critics, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 81 (1969); Sargent
& Corboy, The Basic Protection Plan-Panaceaor Inequity, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 51
(1968). Recent newspaper articles discussing no-fault auto insurance include the Hudson
Dispatch, Feb. 11, 1972, at 47, col. 1; The Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1972, at A16, col. 1.
14 MARKET FACTs, INC., A STUDY OF CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD AUTOMOBILE DAMAGE
AND AUTO INSURANCE COMPENSATION (1970). This study showed that 58% of those interviewed disapproved of a no-fault concept of insurance. Id. at 34.
18 O'Connell, A Balanced Approach to Auto Insurance Reform: O'Connell Answers
His Critics, 41 U. CoLO. L. REv. 81 (1969); O'Connell, Basic Protection-Relief for the Ills
of Automobile Insurance Cases, 27 LA. L. REv. 647 (1967); O'Connell & Wilson, Public
Opinion on No-Fault Auto Insurance: A Survey of the Surveys, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 307;
O'Connell & Wilson, The Department of Transportationand Market Facts Public Opinion
Polls on No-Fault Auto Insurance, 1971 INS. L.J. 239.
16 BAsIc PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 299-339.
17 Id. at 274-76.
18 Id. An example will show the effect of this provision. If an individual is injured
and suffers economic losses of $15,000 plus $10,000 for pain and suffering, he may sue the
individual causing the accident; however, his total recovery is limited to $10,000. The
defendant is immune for the first $10,000 of the recovery for economic losses, and $5,000
of pain and suffering. See id. at 446-47.
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which will pay benefits to the insured regardless of fault. 19 The insured
makes his claim directly against his own insurance carrier, hence the
term "two party coverage.' '20 Benefits from collateral sources such as
wage continuation plans, workmen's compensation, social security
disability coverage, medicare, military and veteran's benefits, and all
forms of accident and health insurance must be subtracted from the
damages otherwise collectible from the basic protection insurance carrier
to arrive at the compensable "net loss." 2' The impact of such a plan
upon the motoring public, the insurance industry, and the legal profession is substantial. In effect, the tort system is abolished for many
automobile accident victims, and the amounts of recovery are significantly reduced.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the principles of nofault generally, and two New Jersey proposals specifically, with regard to the State and Federal Constitutions. Special emphasis will be
placed on the right to jury trial and the ramifications of the proposals
vis4-vis the fourteenth amendment.
A

SCHEME FOR NEW JERSEY

The present reparations system is criticized on the basis that it
simply does not work, that its operation is too expensive, inadequate,
inefficient, cumbersome, and inequitable. 22 Advocates of no-fault
cite statistics such as the 43,488 automobile negligence cases filed in
New Jersey during 1970,23 "accounting for a staggering 54 percent of the
19 Id. at 302.
20 Id. at 344-46.
21 Id. at 278-80. If a party has lost wages of $1,000 and medical bills of $1,500, his

gross loss is $2,500. However, if he pays for Blue Cross/Blue Shield, which plan pays the
entire medical bill, and either he, through his own wage continuation plan, or his employer recovered the full $1,000 wage loss, he would receive nothing from his automobile
insurance carrier.
22 For some in depth reading on the believed inadequacies of the traditional fault
system, see A. CONRAD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE AcCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS-STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964);
R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY?-A STUDY OF AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT CLAIMS (1962); Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A

Study of the Economics of PersonalInjury Litigation, 61 COLuM. L. REv. 1 (1961); James
& Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26
CONN. B.J. 70 (1952); Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1962); Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury
Litigation, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 1115 (1959).
23 THE CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC ISSUES, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN NEW JERSEY

13 (1970). While great emphasis is attached to statistical data in this study, virtually no
source material is cited for these figures.
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entire judicial calendar,"24 to support their premise that the tort system,
as applied to the automobile accident case, is irremediable. They
emphasize calendar congestion, unreliability of fault determinations,
inadequate compensation, and the rising cost of administering the
compensation system as the major defects of the present system and
suggest no-fault as the solution to these problems.
The New Jersey legislature is now considering a number of proposals which would make no-fault a reality in this state. Two of these
plans are incorporated in N.J. Assembly Bill 230225 and N.J. Assembly
Bill 2423.26 Due to the scope and intent of this comment, only a brief
outline of the important provisions of each bill will be discussed in
this section.
Each bill would require every motorist in this state to purchase
both first-party and liability insurance.2 7 Under the personal protection
provisions, the insured would be reimbursed for all reasonable medical
expenses, 28 loss of income due to the inability of the insured to attend

his normal business duties, 2 9 and funeral expenses.80 The important
Id.
N.J. Assembly Bill 2302, introduced March 29, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Bill 2302].
N.J. Assembly Bill 2423, introduced April 26, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Bill 2423].
Bill 2423 art. 1, § la; Bill 2302, § 7b, c. At the present time, New Jersey is not a
compulsory insurance state, but rather a financial responsibility jurisdiction. New Jersey
drivers have three choices with which to comply with the existing financial responsibility
law of this state: (1) obtain an insurance policy with minimum coverage of $10,000 for
injuries to one person, $20,000 for injuries to more than one person on account of a single
occurrence, and $5,000 for damage to property other than the insured's own vehicle, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:6-46 (Supp. 1971-72); (2) depositing $25,000 with the director of motor
vehicles as collateral, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-40 (Supp. 1971-72); or (3) payment of $50 to
the Uninsured Motorist Fund, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-63 (Supp. 1971-72). The fee for uninsured motorists is not insurance. In the event the Fund makes any payment for damages
caused by an uninsured motorist, the Fund becomes a judgment creditor of the individual.
Failure to reimburse the Fund could result in the loss of driving privileges in this state.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-8 (Supp. 1971-72).
28 Bill 2423 art. 2, § 6a provides:
(1) Allowable expenses... [C]onsist of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's
care, recovery or rehabilitation. Allowable expenses within personal protection insurance coverage shall not include (i) charges for a hospital room in excess of a
reasonable and customary charge for semiprivate accommodations except when the
injured person requires special or intensive care ....
Bill 2302 is generally to the same effect, with the exception that it provides that:
In no event will allowable expenses within basic protection coverage include a
charge for a hospital room in excess of a reasonable and customary charge for
semiprivate accommodations ....
Id. at § 1.
29 Bill 2423 art. 2, § 6a(2)(ii) limits wage loss to $750 per month with a reduction o1
15% for the income tax advantage. Bill 2302, § 3b(3) limits wage loss to $1,000 per month
with § 1(e) providing for the reduction of this amount by 15% due to the income tax
advantage.
30 Bill 2423 art. 2, § 6a(l)(i); Bill 2302, § 1. Both bills provide for funeral reimbursement up to $1,000.
24
25
26
27
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element in determining compensation is not, however, total expenses,
but rather what is termed "net loss."31 The result is the abolition of
the collateral source rule in New Jersey. 82 If an individual incurs a
loss as a result of an automobile accident and receives compensation
from other insurance plans (such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield), that
amount will be deducted from the "personal protection benefits" due
from the no-fault insurer. While the purchase of no-fault first-party
benefits is mandatory, the plans exclude various occurrences and per3
sons from coverage .
Bill 2302, § 1 defines "net loss" as:
[L]oss less subtractable benefits received from sources other than basic and added
protection insurance.
32 Bill 2302, § 1 provides:
a. Except as otherwise provided in this section, all benefits one receives or is
entitled to receive because of the injury, from sources other than basic or added
protection insurance are subtracted from loss in calculating net loss.
Section l(b) exempts support payments, devises or bequests, and gratuities. Section I(c)
exempts tort claims. Bill 2423 art. 2, § 6(3) provides:
b. Social security benefits. The amount of all disability and survivor benefits
a claimant recovers or is entitled to recover under the Social Security Act (U.S.
Code, Title 42, Sections 301 et seq.) because of accidental bodily injury shall be
subtracted from the personal protection insurance benefits otherwise payable for
the injury.
Bill 2423 art. 2, § 12 provides:
a. Statutory sources. The personal protection insurer shall have the primary
obligation to indemnify for the elements of loss as defined in section 6. a. because
of accidental bodily injury . . . . Payment by such insurer . . . shall operate to
discharge, to the extent of such payment, the obligations of any person, organization, insurer or governmental agency to indemnify against such loss under any
workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation or disability benefits law
or any similar law.
b. Other collateral sources. Any person, organization or insurer may include
in any contract or benefit plan which it offers or sells, a provision excluding
benefits for accidental bodily injury which are payable under personal protection
insurance.
33 Bill 2302, § 3c provides:
(2) Each insurer shall issue, at the option of any person purchasing a basic
protection policy, a policy endorsement or clause which shall provide an exclusion
from personal injury basic protection benefits . . . when such injured person's
conduct contributed to his injury in any of the following ways while operating
a motor vehicle:
(a) while under the influence of alcohol or a narcotic or hallucinogenic drug;
(b) while committing a felony or seeking to avoid lawful apprehension by a
police officer;
(c) while acting with the specific intent of causing damage to himself or others.
Bill 2423 art. 3. § 15 provides:
a. Property. Damage to the following kinds of property is excluded from
property protection insurance benefits:
(1) motor vehicles and their contents;
(2) property owned by a person named in a property protection insurance
policy, his spouse or a relative of either domiciled in the same household ....
Bill 2423 art. 2, § 9 also provides:
Persons not entitled to personal protection insurance benefits. A person is
not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental
bodily injury if at the time of the accident,
31
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Perhaps the most important aspect of no-fault legislation is the
abolition of the judicial fact-finding procedure. This elimination is
accomplished by means of exemptions granted to every auto negligence
defendant which foreclose the recovery of damages in certain instances.
Bill 2302 sets out various levels of exemption; 4 Bill 2423, by granting
each defendant a total exemption,8 5 completely abolishes the tort system
as a basis for apportioning damages in an automobile negligence case.
CONSTrrUTIONAL CAVEATS

Trial By Jury
The concept of trial by jury is grounded in the common law. Many
jurisdictions in the United States, however, have made specific proa. such person was using a motor vehicle which he had taken unlawfully,
unless he reasonably believed that he was entitled to take and use the vehicles;
or
b. such person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in
the accident with respect to which the security required by section 2 was not
in effect; or
c. such person was not a resident of this State, and was an occupant of a
motor vehicle not registered in this State, and was not insured by an insurer which
has filed a certification in compliance with section 37.
84 Bill 2302 § 5 provides:
a. Damages on tort. Basic protection benefits provided in this act because
of injury suffered in an accident occuring in this State are granted in lieu of
damages in tort to the extent indicated in paragraphs b. and c. of this section.
These provisions do not apply to injury suffered in an out-of-state accident.
b. Tort liability precluded in certain cases. Every person who is a basic protection insured with respect to an injury is entitled to an exemption from tort
liability for the injury unless the tort damages otherwise recoverable because
of the injury include either:
(1) an amount in excess of $5,000.00 for pain and suffering;
(2) an amount in excess of $10,000.00 for elements of the measure of recovery
other than pain and suffering.
c. Tort liability reduced in certain cases. Every person who is a basic protection insured with respect to an injury is entitled to an exemption reducing
his tort liability to the extent provided in this section.
(1) The amount of one's exemption applying against damages found for
pain and suffering is the greater of the following: (a) the sum of the limits of
all added protection insurance under a policy or policies of which he is a named
insured or an additional insured applying to the injury and providing benefits for
pain and suffering or (b) $5,000.00, or
(2) The amount of one's exemption applying against damages found for
elements of recovery other than pain and suffering is $10,000.00 plus the sum
of the limits of all added protection insurance under a policy or policies of which
he is a named insured or an additional insured applying to the injury and providing benefits other than those for pain and suffering.
35 Bill 2423 art. 5 provides:
19. Exemption precludes tort liability. Whenever accidental bodily injury or
accidental damage to tangible property arises out of the ownership, operation,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, an owner, registrant,
operator or occupant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident and persons or
organizations legally responsible for his acts or omissions are exempt from tort
liability for the bodily injury or property damage, provided that an owner,
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vision for this right a part of their constitutions.3" New Jersey is no
exception. The Constitution of this State reads, in pertinent part:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the
Legislature may authorize the trial of civil causes by a jury of six
persons when the matter in dispute does not exceed fifty dollars.
The Legislature may provide that in any civil cause a verdict may
be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury. The Legislature
may authorize the trial of the issue of mental incompetency with37
out a jury.
This section remains substantially the same as it was when enacted in

1776.38
Since both the pending no-fault bills and a vast majority of the
other no-fault plans restrict, either partially or totally, the right of a
citizen to seek redress in a court of law for injuries sustained in an
automobile accident,89 the constitutional mandate incorporated in
registrant, operator or occupant shall not be so exempt if he is excluded under
section 9 from personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury
arising from the same motor vehicle accident. This exemption shall apply wherever
the law of this State is controlling in determining tort liability.
36 See, e.g., MICH. CONsr. art. 1, § 14 (1963); MINN. CONsT. art. 1, § 4 (1857).
37 N.J. CONST. art. 1, par. 9.
38 N.J. CONST. § XXII (1776) provides:
That the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as
have been heretofore practiced in this colony, shall still remain in force, until they
shall be altered by a future law of the legislature; such parts only excepted, as
are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this charter; and that the
inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed, as a part of the law
of this colony, without repeal, forever.
N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (1844), while omitting the common law requirement, reinstituted
the basic provision of jury trials:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the legislature may
authorize the trial of civil suits, when the matter in dispute does not exceed fifty
dollars, by a jury of six men.
The clear intent of these provisions was to insure that all civil litigants not heretofore
precluded must be given the right to a trial by jury. For actions not entitled to a jury
trial, see State v. Doty, 32 N.J.L. 403 (Sup. Ct. 1868) (contempt hearings); Wood v. Executors of Tallman, I N.J.L. 177, 181 (Sup. Ct. 1793) (suits in Chancery, Orphans Court or
Prerogative Court).
89 The following is a comparative list of when a motorist will be able to institute a
court action under various no-fault proposals:
Plan
KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTrrION PLAN
(N.J. Assembly Bill 2302, § 5a,b(l)(2) includes the same provision)
AMERICAN

INSURANCE

ASSOCIATION

COM-

(N.J.
Assembly Bill 2423 art. 5, § 19 includes
the same provision)
PLE=E PERSONAL

PROTECTION

PLAN

Right to sue in tort available, IF:
Victim has more than $10,000 in basic
protection losses or $5,000 in pain and
suffering.
NEVER
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Article 1, section 9 of the New Jersey Constitution is of paramount
importance. The sole prerequisite required by this provision is that the
cause of action must have existed at common law. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey has interpreted this requirement to mean that any
cause of action which existed prior to the adoption of the 1776 Constitution must be accorded this right. 40 This interpretation raises the
issue of whether the tortious act in question was recognized under the
common law in every detail. If such is the requirement, then the
privilege granted under Article 1, section 9 becomes illusory. The
legislature, by merely abolishing the remedy, or by changing the cause of
action in some form, could render the trial by jury guarantee useless.
Naturally, automobile accidents did not occur, nor was a cause of
action for such an accident recognized at the time of the adoption of
the 1776 Constitution. Transportation has undergone several revolutions in the past century, from horseback to automobile, jet travel to
space exploration. However, while the causes of accidents have changed,
the principles of law which apply have undergone relatively little
change. It therefore appears that the more enlightened approach would
apply Article 1, section 9 with as much force to the automobile accident
as section 22 of the 1776 Constitution was applied to the horse and
buggy accident.
RocK FELLER-NEw YoRK COMPENSATION

NEVER

PLAN

COTTER PACKAGE

SEN. HART UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE INsURANcE Acr
MASSACHUSETTS PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE LAW

Victim can sue as now but non-fault benefits are deducted and damages for pain
and suffering are limited to 50% of nedical expenses up to $500 and 100% of
medical expenses in excess of $500.
Victim may sue for catastrophic harm;
recovery may include pain and suffering.
Victim can sue if he has incurred more
than $500 in medical costs or has suffered
disfigurement, loss of sight, hearing, or
body member. Any fractured bone also
entitles victim to sue. Damages are reduced by non-fault benefits received.

TRIAL, Oct.-Nov., 1970, at 8-9.
40 Board of Health v. New York Cent. R.R., 10 N.J. 294, 303-04, 90 A.2d 729, 733-34
(1952); Town of Montclair v. Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. 479, 483-90, 79 A.2d 288, 290-94 (1951). In
Montclair, the court stated:
The right of trial by jury, which was thus confirmed and retained inviolate, is not
and has never been a right which a defendant could invoke in all instances, even
in charges of a criminal nature. It is and has been applicable only in those matters
in which it existed anciently under the common law.
6 N.J. at 484, 79 A.2d at 290-91.
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Support for this argument is found in the application of the
workmen's compensation acts. Proponents of no-fault, when confronted
with the prospect that such a plan would run afoul of the constitutional
requirement of trial by jury, point to these acts as evidence that the
legislature may abolish the jury trial guarantee. 41 A careful look at
the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act and the interpretative
decisions, however, reveals that the conclusion of constitutionality was
achieved because the right to trial by jury remained intact. The Act
provides:
When personal injury is caused to an employee by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, of which the
actual or lawfully imputed negligence of the employer is the
natural and proximate cause, he shall receive compensation therefor from his employer, provided the employee was himself not
willfully negligent at the time of receiving such injury, and the
question of whether the employee was willfully negligent shall be
one of fact to be submitted to the jury .... 42
This legislation was enacted to give employees a right to compensation
regardless of fault. It substituted statutory schedules of loss for the
48
traditional jury determinations.
The Act further provides that the right to compensation will not
be lost even if the injury was the result of a negligent act committed
by a fellow employee 4 4 or if the employee assumed the risks of the
position.4 5 Without more, the Act certainly appears to abolish the common law negligence action for injuries sustained while engaged as an
employee. However, the drafters of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
recognizing that the right to trial by jury was protected, enacted the
following section:
When employer and employee shall by agreement, either
express or implied .

.

. accept the provisions of this article com-

pensation for personal injuries to, or for the death of, such
employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his em41 For decisions upholding the constitutionality of the workmen's compensation acts,
see Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243
U.S. 210 (1917); Young v. Sterling Leather Works, 91 N.J.L. 289, 102 A. 395 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1917); Troth v. Millville Bottle Works, 89 N.J.L. 219, 98 A. 435 (Ct. Err. & App.
1916).
42 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 (1959).
43 For a discussion of the statutory substitution issue, see United States Cas. Co.
v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J. Super. 444, 449, 67 A.2d 880, 883 (App. Div. 1949), reted
on other grounds, 4 N.J. 157, 72 A.2d 190 (1950).
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-2 (1959).
45 Id.
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ployment shall be made by the employer without regard to the
negligence of the employer .... 46

This provision encompasses the theory of waiver. A person may waive
his constitutional right to trial by jury if a reasonable alternative is
available, provided that such alternative is not violative of any other

constitutional provision such as due process or equal protection. 47 The
waiver is either expressed by the parties through actual consent, or
implied from the mere silence of the employee. The courts, in con-

struing the waiver provisions of the Act, have stated that there
must be some affirmative rejection of the compensation provisions of
the Act by the employee for him to retain his common law negligence
action, as modified by the Act.4 s Regardless of the method used, the
important aspect of the legislation is that, for those employees who
desire to retain their right to sue an employer, such a procedure remains viable. The only prerequisite is that they affirmatively claim that
right.
Bills 2423 and 2302 make no provision for the acceptance or
rejection of the procedures established. Bill 2423 provides:
Continuous security. The owner or registrant of a motor
vehicle required to be registered in this State shall maintain
security as defined by section 2 in effect continuously throughout
49
the registration period.
The waiver provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act which apparently saved it from constitutional infirmity are noticeably absent
from these two proposals, and no provision for a constitutional amendment has been incorporated into either plan. 50 Furthermore, a successful
no-fault system must assume universal coverage, and if an elective type
statute were to be enacted, it would be doomed to failure.
46 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (1959).
47 See Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 84 N.J.L. 85, 86 A. 451 (Sup. Ct. 1913), aff'd,
86 N.J.L. 701, 91 A. 1070 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914).
48 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Popovich, 18 N.J. 218. 226, 113 A.2d 666, 670 (1955);
Gotkin v. Weinberg, 2 N.J. 305, 308, 66 A.2d 438, 439 (1949).
49 Bill 2423 art. 1, § la (emphasis added).
50 For important provisions relating to constitutional amendments, see N.J. CNsT. art.
IX, paras. 1, 2, 3, & 4 (1947) which,
(1) provides for the filing of the proposed amendments with all members of the
House and Senate. It requires a three-fifths majority in each house.
(2) provides for the entering of the amendment on the journal of each house.
(3) requires the publication of the proposed amendment with at least one newspaper
in each county.
(4) requires a referendum vote by the citizens of the state, passage requiring a
majority vote.
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In the recent case of Pinnick v. Cleary,51 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in evaluating the constitutional basis of the
newly enacted no-fault statute, 52 abruptly stated:
Finally, argument has been made to us that c. 670 violates...
art. 15 (right to trial by jury sacred) . . . contained in the Declara-

tion of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution .... We see no
necessity for a discussion of c. 670 in light of these constitutional
provisions. It is entirely clear that the statute violates none of
them. 58
However, Chief Justice Tauro, in a concurring opinion, emphasized
the distinction between no-fault and workmen's compensation:
Parenthetically, our workmen's compensation law, which was
drafted for the benefit of the employee, and not to reduce insurance
rates, still permits an employee to retain his common law rights
as an alternative to coverage by workmen's compensation."
The Chief Justice rebuked the majority for its cursory treatment of
the constitutional issues:
A novel statute, denying a long-standing common law right
to a substantial number-if not a majority--of persons injured
by another's negligence indeed presents a "solemn occasion." Any
law so drastically altering 55
legal rights and liabilities deserves
minute scrutiny and analysis.
Notwithstanding the decision reached in Pinnick, the New Jersey
proposals alter the common law method of compensation even more
drastically than the Massachusetts no-fault plan. 56 Bill 2423 completely
Mass. -,

51

-

52

MASS.

58 -

271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
ch. 90, §§ 34A et seq. (Supp. 1971).
Mass. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 611.

54 Id.

at

ANN. LAWS
-,

271 N.E.2d at 614.

55 Id. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 613.
56 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90, §§ 34A et seq. (Supp. 1971). The Massachusetts plan speci-

fically sets a "threshold amount" above which an injured motorist may sue in tort for
damages including pain and suffering. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1971) provides:
In any action of tort brought as a result of bodily injury, sickness or disease,
arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
within this commonwealth by the defendant, a plaintiff may recover damages for
pain and suffering, including mental suffering associated with such injury, sickness
or disease, only if the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in treating such
injury . . . are determined to be in excess of five hundred dollars unless such
injury, sickness or disease (1) causes death, or (2) consists in whole or in part of
loss of a body member, or (3) consists in whole or in part of permanent and serious
disfigurement, or (4) results in such loss of sight or hearing ....
While the above plan sets a threshold of 500, N.J. Assembly Bill 2423 completely
abolishes auto negligence suits, and Bill 2302 sets a threshold of $10,000 for net economic
loss, or $5,000 for pain and suffering.
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abolishes the right of trial by jury through abolishing all right to
tort suits. 57 Bill 2302 establishes a minimum of $5,000 for pain and
suffering,58 and $10,000 for the other elements of damages. 9 It would
appear that in light of the legislative action taken with regard to the
Workmen's Compensation Act and the clear mandate of Article 1,
section 9, any attempt to completely separate the automobile negligence
case and the common law method of determining damages (trial by jury)
is contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the New Jersey Constitution.
Equal Protection

The particular equal protection test to be applied is determined,
at least in part, by the nature of the classification produced by the
legislation involved. Thus, where the classification is considered "suspect," the state must show a compelling interest for creating it.6O
Despite notable decisions which suggest expansion of the definition of
"suspect," the only classifications which can be confidently labeled as
such at this point in time are race, lineage, and alienage. 6 1
When the resultant classification does not fall within the "suspect"
category, the burden upon the state to justify the purpose of the legislation is considerably lessened; the response of the state need only be
rationally related to the problem at hand. As long as the plan is not
arbitrary or capricious, it will be upheld as valid.6
57 Bill 2423 art. 5.
58 Bill 2302, § 5b(l).
59 Id. § 5b(2).
00 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944). See also Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L.
REv. 1065, 1087-91 (1969).
81 One area of equal protection which has produced a great deal of controversy in
the last five years is whether the discussions in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(deterrence of indigents from immigrating into a state is not a constitutionally permissible
state objective), Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (declaring a
relationship between the right to vote and wealth invalid) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (holding wealth as a condition of the right of appeal in criminal cases
void), have transformed indigency into an inherently suspect classification. One notable
commentator cautiously suggests that wealth classifications have been, or at least should
be, so transformed. Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. RaV. 7, 19-33 (1969). The better view, however, is that only
when wealth is coupled with a fundamental right does a "suspect" classification arise.
Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education,Municipal Services, and Wealth,
7 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 103, 112-14 (1972). The three previously mentioned
cases support this view.
62 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961); Two Guys from HarrisonAllentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 589-92 (1961).
63 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963).
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A more fundamental consideration, however, is defining the
categories created. Any equal protection analysis of a particular piece
of legislation must initially examine the classifications established by
that legislation. The effect of the various provisions of Bills 2423 and
2302 would be the creation of at least two such classifications which, in
64
light of the fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantee,
merit inquiry.
Recovery for lost wages is limited to $1000 per month under Bill
230265 and $750 per month under Bill 242366 (less 15 percent under both
plans). Under Bill 2302 the victim has no right to sue for wages over
these amounts until those lost wages total $10,000; even then, he may
only sue for the excess.6 7 Under Bill 2423 he has absolutely no right to
68
sue for lost wages above $750 per month.
The equal protection issue presented by these provisions is a
wealth classification which is different from that which usually receives
judicial attention. A court recognizing the classification would consider
whether a category based on a particular degree of wealth, rather than
the total lack of it, is violative of equal protection.
The practical effect of this categorization may be illustrated by the
following example:
A man earning $1,500 per month ($18,000 per year) is disabled in
an automobile accident and is unable to return to work for one
year. He will receive $12,000 under one plan and $7,500 under
64 The classifications discussed hereafter are by no means intended to be all-inclusive.
Another significant problem which should be mentioned is the intra-class categorization
created by the difference in medical fees throughout the state and the differing ability
of persons in the various economic strata to pay. These factors would have a direct effect
on the recovery under the general damages provisions. In Grace v. Howlett, Civil No.
4737-71 (Ill. Ch., Dec. 29, 1971), afJ'd, Civil No. 44902-72 (Ill. Sup. Ct., Apr. 17, 1972), an
Illinois decision by a court of intermediate jurisdiction declaring that state's no-fault
plan unconstitutional, the court remarked:
Moreover, the vast disparity in hospital costs and physicians' charges throughout the state results in a patently arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination ....
The evidence is also undisputed that a person's ability to pay is definitely a
factor in determining the fees of physicians. Thus, under Section 608 persons with
identical injuries and requiring identical medical treatment could receive widely
disparate amounts of compensation for their general damages, depending on
purely fortuitous factors such as where the injury occurred, which hospital was
used, what doctor was employed, and the wealth or poverty of the victim. This
is discrimination of the rankest kind, impossible for this Court to rationalize,
justify or sustain.
Civil No. 4737-71 (Ill. Ch., Dec. 29, 1971).
65 Bill 2302, § 3a(3).
66 Bill 2423 art. 2, § 6a(2).
67 Bill 2302, § 5b(2).
68 No such provision is set out in the bill.
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another, thereby losing $6,000 and $10,500, respectively, without
a means of recovering that loss.
The ostensible legislative purpose behind these ceilings is that such
amounts provide enough funds for the necessaries of life during the
period of incapacitation. The result of the legislation, however, would
be to thrust those citizens earning more than the specified amounts into
a class of people who are deprived of a portion of their livelihood. This
consideration assumes added importance in modem America, with its
proclivity for spending as much or more than is earned.
The standard of review to be applied to the aforementioned classification merits some discussion. A suspect criterion has not been established and, at least under this analysis, the state would not be forced
to show a compelling interest. The classification, nevertheless, is based
upon wealth, and the question arises as to whether a "fundamental
right" has been denied.6 9 The confiscation of a portion of income by
the state might be considered an infringement on the right to earn a
living. 70 If earning a living were considered a fundamental freedom, a
showing of a compelling interest would be required on the part of the
state. In any event, the state would have to bear the burden of illustrating that the ceilings were not arbitrary or capricous.
Bill 2302 provides that tort suits may be brought only when the
amount of damages sought exceeds $5,000 for pain and suffering, or
$10,000 for causes other than pain and suffering.7 ' Bill 2423 abrogates
72
all tort suits regardless of the monetary amount.
Both bills thus create a class of individuals who no longer possess
access to the judicial system for the redress of their grievances. Free
access is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution, but it is certainly
implied therein, and this proposition has been recognized by several
state courts which have dealt with the issue. 78 In the no-fault context,
it could be argued that the fundamental right of free access has been
denied to a class of individuals based only on the fortuitous circumstances of the nature of the tort by which they were injured.
Such an argument would be severely limited, however, by the
7 4 In that case, the
Supreme Court's holding in Boddie v. Connecticut.
69 See note 63 supra.
70 See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506-08 (1959).
71 Bill 2302, § 5b(1), (2).
72 Bill 2423 art. 5.
78 See, e.g., Harrington v. Harrington, 269 A.2d 310 (Me. 1970); Suber v. Suber, 38
U.S.L.W. 2169 (N.J. Ch. 1969); Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup.
Ct. 1968).
74 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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Court was presented with the opportunity to raise free access to the
dignity of a fundamental right, but opted instead for a due process
approach. This case will therefore be discussed further under the
section dealing with that fourteenth amendment guarantee.
Due Process
"There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and
taking begins," 75 but portions of the New Jersey Bills completely abrogate the right of recovery in certain instances relating to automobile
tort actions. 76 This abrogation might be considered a taking of property
without just compensation and therefore violative of the due process
77
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The theory offered to overcome this argument is that no-fault
seeks only to streamline the machinery whereby an accident victim is
compensated for his losses. As was stated in Pinnick:
In arguing that the cause of action affected by c. 670 constitutes a vested property right, the plaintiff seems to ignore the
distinction between a cause of action which has accrued and the
expectation which every citizen has if a legal wrong should occur
to find redress according to the rules of statutory and common law
applicable at that time....

The citizen may find that events oc-

curring after passage of such a statute place him in a different
position legally from that which he would have occupied had they
occurred before passage of the statute. He has no cause, howhis rights are not now what they
ever, to complain solely because
78
would have been before.
The Pinnick court, then, was of the opinion that an individual citizen
does not have a vested interest in the means which the state provides to
uphold his rights, as long as those rights remain intact. The same court,
nevertheless, noted:
In the instant case, however, the Legislature has not attempted
to abolish the preexisting right of tort recovery and leave the automobile accident victim without redress. On the contrary . . . the

statute has affected his substantive rights of recovery only in one
respect and has simply altered his method of enforcing them in
all others. 79
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
See, e.g., Bill 2423 art. 5 (discontinuing all tort actions in automobile cases); Bill
2302, § 5b(l), (2) (abolishing the right to sue in tort when damages are under specified
amounts).
77 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US. 393 (1922).
78 Mass. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 599-600.
79 Id. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 602.
75

78
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The "one respect" to which the court referred was the legislative
elimination of recoveries for pain and suffering up to a specified amount.
Both New Jersey Bills have substantially the same effect (Bill 2423,
however, completely discontinues this theory).
The issue raised is one of specificity: Is the preexisting right of
tort recovery to be defined as the right to be compensated for automobile accidents generally, or the right to be compensated for each
and every possible element of damage included in a standard automobile
accident complaint? If the former is true, then a legislature presumably
has the right to abolish a specific right as long as it properly belongs to
a larger continuum of tort law. For example, when the workmen's
compensation laws were enacted, individuals struck by falling objects
could have been justifiably excepted since the general tort theory of
employment-related accidents was preserved.
Clearly, a legislature must recognize every right of recovery which
was open to the individual prior to the passage of the legislation. The
failure to do so results in a taking of vested property interests without
just compensation. The total abolition of a preexisting right cannot be
justified merely because that right is connected to more general theories.
When such abolition results from state action, regulation has ended and
taking has begun.8 0 Under this approach, a statute which resulted in
a taking could be struck down whether or not any rational relationship
was demonstrated.8 1
The effective abolition of the collateral source rule might also
constitute a violation under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
An individual who pays premiums on medical insurance, wage continuation or similar insurance plans, would experience a direct deduction of the benefits received from the award granted under no-fault.
If the benefits from such private insurance plans are to be considered
vested property interests, as they logically should be, they cannot be
confiscated by the state. 2 On the other hand, if there is no taking of
80 It is true that the attitude of the federal government towards the exercise of the
state's police power has been liberalized almost out of existence. Carolene Products v.
United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). However, the issue here presented seems to be an
obvious enough taking to justify its reemergence.
81 369 U.S. at 594-95. The Goldblatt Court considered a discussion of whether
the action was an unconstitutional taking as a necessary prelude to an examination of
whether the exercise of the police power in that case was reasonable. Thus, the implication is strong that, had the action in that case been held confiscatory, the determination
of reasonableness would have been mere surplusage.
82 This theory was bolstered by the recent case of Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F. Supp.
1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1970), which held that § 224 of the Social Security Act, requiring a
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property, the regulation must comport with classical conceptions of
a valid exercise of the police power. These conceptions, however, require only "reasonableness"-the statute must not be arbitrary or
capricious.
A related due process consideration is the one which underpins
the rationale of Boddie v. Connecticut. As was stated earlier, Boddie
could have been easily decided on the "fundamental right" theory of
equal protection. The Court, however, rejected such an approach and
turned instead to due process. The resulting formula may be stated as
follows: Where the state possesses the only means of adjusting a fundamental human relationship, that adjustment procedure may not be
84
discontinued without providing an alternative one.
As this test is applied to no-fault, the question arises whether a
reasonable substitute has been provided. The answer again depends
deduction of Workmen's Compensation benefits from Social Security disability awards
in certain instances, was repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See Comment, No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance:
A Constitutional Perspective, 46 ST. JoHN's L. Rzv. 104, 117-18 (1971).
The Belcher case was based primarily on Goldberg v. Kelly. 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
which implicitly accorded welfare benefits the status of a vested property right, and,
as the court in Belcher remarked:
[I]t seems to us to be patently unfair for the welfare recipient . . . to have a
"property right status" with all the procedural safeguards of due process, while
the social security recipient . . . is deprived of such status and protection.
317 F. Supp. at 1297. By analogy, then, the same "vested property interest" theory should
apply to private insurance plans.
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, and distinguishing Goldberg, held (four to
three) that there was no constitutional violation. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971). The grounds upon which the case was decided, however, do not seriously hamper
the argument proposed herein. The Court held:
The fact that social security benefits are financed in part by taxes on an employee's
wages does not in itself limit the power of Congress to fix the levels of benefits
under the Act or the conditions upon which they may be paid. Nor does an
expectation interest in public benefits confer a contractual right to receive the
upon which the District
expected amounts. Our decision in Goldberg v. Kelly ....
Court relied, held that as a matter of procedural due process the interest of a
welfare recipient in the continued payment of benefits is sufficiently fundamental
to prohibit the termination of those benefits without a prior evidentiary hearing.
But there is no controversy over procedure in the present case, and the analogy
drawn in Goldberg between social welfare and "property," . . . cannot be
stretched to impose a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to make
substantive changes in the law of entitlement to public benefits.
Id. at 80-81. The rationale of Belcher, then, is inextricably connected with the fact that the
benefits involved were public in nature. In fact, the Court specifically differentiated between these benefits and a "contractual right to receive the expected amounts." An
agreement between an individual and an insurance company is a contractual right rather
than a public benefit.
83 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
84 401 U.S. at 380-83.
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upon how sensitive a reviewing court would be to individuals included
in the class which no-fault attempts to serve. Granted, certain methods
of recovery have been supplied to individuals involved in automobile
accidents, but for persons with certain types of damages or less than
a particular amount, all redress is annulled.8 5
EXISTING PROBLEMS:

Is No-FAULT THE ANSWER?

The foregoing examination of the due process and equal protection
guarantees and the plethora of standards of review extracted therefrom
constitute an unwieldy tool with which to measure the state interests
involved. Applying each test to each interest would be an arduous task.
The result, moreover, depends as much upon schools of constitutional
thought as it does upon absolutes. No such application, therefore, will
be undertaken. What follows is a critical analysis of the arguments presented in favor of a faultless system based upon common sense and
practicality.
Calendar Congestion
Calendar congestion is a recent phenomenon. It has become intolerable in those counties where the influx of criminal cases, brought
about by the steady increase in crime, particularly drug abuse offenses,
has more than doubled in the last five years. 88 Proponents of no-fault
imply that calendar congestion is extremely widespread, that every
state is saddled with this insurmountable problem, and that the main
reason for the congestion is the increase in automobile accident litigation. For the most part, this attack is based upon superficial evidence.
One knowledgeable expert in the field has stated that serious 87 conges85 Akin to the foregoing discussion is the approach employed in New York Cent. R.R.
Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). The Supreme Court therein considered the question of
whether workmen's compensation laws confiscated property without due process of law.
Although they were careful not to engage in dicta, the Court, in reasoning not unlike that
in Boddie, attached considerable importance to the fact that a substitute was supplied:
[I]t perhaps may be doubted whether the State could abolish all rights of action
on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting up something
adequate in their stead. No such question is here presented, and we intimate no
opinion upon it. The statute under consideration sets aside one body of rules only
to establish another system in its place.
Id. at 201. If the White case can indeed be read to require a reasonable substitute, the
various no-fault systems would also meet with difficulty on this ground.
86 See Comment, Drug Law Revision-The New Jersey Approach, 2 SEroN HA.L L.
Ray. 369 (1971). The authors, referring to the Uniform Crime Reports, State of New
Jersey 1967, at 75 (1968), Uniform Crime Reports, State of New Jersey 1968, at 73 (1969),
and Uniform Crime Reports, State of New Jersey 1969, at 70 (1970), indicate that the
number of drug arrests alone have increased from 5,045 in 1967 to 13,364 in 1969. Id.
87 For the purposes of this comment a waiting period in excess of two years will be
considered serious congestion.
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tion and delay is confined to seventeen metropolitan areas within eight
states. 8 In New Jersey, civil calendar congestion exists in the counties
of Essex, Hudson, Passaic, and Middlesex. These same counties also
experience very active criminal calendars.8 9
Nationally, automobile litigation occupies but fifteen percent of
the court dockets. 90 Although the number of liability claims resulting
from automobile accidents is immense (for. example, there were
3,750,000 personal injury incidents in the United States during 1967), 91
the enormity of the problem should not overshadow the manner of
disposition of these accident claims. Ninety-four percent of these claims
are settled without any suit being instituted,9 2 four percent result in suits
that are settled without a trial,93 and only two percent result in a
88 Ross, DRI Studies Refute Court Delay Claims Of Critics, 36 INS. COUNSEL

J. 46, 47

(1969).
89 N.J. ADMIN. DIR. OF THE COURTS ANN. REPORT (1969-70). The report gives the
following diagram for calendar congestion by county and type of case.
CIVIL BACKLOG

County
Atlantic
Bergen
Camden
Essex
Hudson
Mercer
Middlesex
Monmouth
Passaic
Union
Id. at 54, 70.

CRIMINAL

Auto

Other

Total

2,793
2,148
4,623
4,110

2,565
990
4,223
2,614

5,358
3,138
8,846
6,724

3,880
2,171
2,168
1,938

1,818
1,242
1,800
1,558

5,698
3,413
3,968
3,496

Total
646
570
1,569
4,100
1,617
1,240
1,616
1,202
1,139
991

It is apparent that the counties with the heaviest backlog in the civil division are the
counties where the criminal calendar is extensive. This high criminal case load requires
the assignment of many more judges to the criminal division than the civil, thereby
creating the civil backlogs. The Report shows the following assignments.
CRIMINAL

Atlantic
Bergen
Camden
Essex
Hudson
Mercer
Middlesex
Monmouth
Passaic
Union

CIVIL

1
8
2
7
6
3
10
3
3
3

90 Julien, Keeton-O'Connell: Myth or Panacea, 40 N.Y.S.B.J. 256, 260 (1968).
91 DOT, REPORT ON MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION
UNITED STATES 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DOT REPORT].
92 Martin, Morality and the Fault System, 40 Miss. L.J. 485, 487 (1969).
93 Id.
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trial.9 4 It has also been calculated that less than one-fourth of all civil
cases are automobile accident cases. 95 New Jersey's calendar statistics
are in general harmony with the national averages. 06 The recent Department of Transportation study, which released a report very favorable
to the no-fault cause, indicates that delay, where it does exist, is most
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 While complete statistical data have not been made available for New Jersey, the

following statistics show that New Jersey has relatively the same percentage figures as the
national average.
1969-1970
BY TRIAL (19%)

AUTO NEG. (19%)

Jury Trials
(Partial)
Complete
Non-Jury Trials
(Partial)
Complete
TOTAL TRIED

OTHER (18%)

1,074
1,746

753
707

61
236

217
887

3,117

2,564

WITHOUT TRIAL (Settled, Dismissed or Discontinued)
AUTO NEG. (81%)

Before Trial
Date Assigned
After Date Assigned
On Trial Date
TOTAL TRIED

OTHER

CRIMINAL

4,047
2,110
6,985

5,094
1,609
4,921

4,078
2,224
7,347

13,142
(81%)

11,624
(82%)

13,649
(81.5%)

N.J. ADMIN. DIR. OF THE COURTS ANN. REPORT (1971).

Recent figures released by the Administrative Director of the Courts show that the
number of cases filed in the civil division has decreased for the period 1970-71, while the
criminal case load continues to rise.

Law Division-Civil
Added
Disposed of (total)
Jury trials
Non-jury
Settled
Law Division-Criminal
Added
Disposed of (total)
Jury trial
Non-jury
Plea
Dismissal
94 N.J.L.J. 988 (1971).

Sept. 1, 1970Aug. 31, 1971

Sept. 1, 1969Aug. 31, 1970

32,324
31,482
4,184
1,383
25,036

33,892
31,528
4,280
1,401
24,766

25,159
22,367
3,444
701
10,405
7,817

19,924
16,823
2,947
569
8,007
5,300
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often due to the priority given to the trial of criminal cases and the
97
voluntary delay of the parties filing lawsuits.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the relationship of calendar congestion to automobile cases, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in the
recent case of Darrow v. Hanover Township,98 when confronted with
the contention that retrospective application of the abolition of the
interspousal immunity doctrine would result in severe court congestion,
stated:
Plaintiff ... contends that retrospective application of Immer
will result in an undue burden on the court system. While we recognize fully that court congestion may work a substantial prejudice
to litigants, we would never exclude from our courts persons having
just causes of action on this basis. The court system was designed
to serve the needs of the people and it would hardly be fulfilling
its purpose if it excluded litigants because of inconvenience to
lawyers and judges."
The court further considered the impact of calendar congestion by
referring to FaIzone v. Busch, 10 which involved the abrogation of the
impact rule in tort actions. There the court stated:
[T]he fear of an expansion of litigation should not deter courts
from granting relief in meritorious cases; the proper remedy is an
expansion of the judicial machinery, not a decrease in the availability of justice. 01
These two recent decisions illustrate a recognition of the basic concept
that calendar congestion is corrected not by curtailment of the rights of
the people, but by expansion of the court system. Further efficiency
could be gained by streamlining the judicial administrative procedures,
10 2
and by adopting a pretrial settlement structure for all civil cases.
97 Brainard, Implications of DOT Auto Insurance Study for the Tort Liability System,
1970 INS. L.J. 575, 577-78.
98 58 N.J. 410, 278 A.2d 200 (1971).
99 Id. at 414, 278 A.2d at 202 (emphasis added).
100 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
101 Id. at 567, 214 A.2d at 16 (emphasis added).
102 REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY

SUPREME COURT'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CALENDAR

CONTROL-CIVIL. (1971). The committee made, inter alia, the following recommendations:

1. Modification of the daily calendar call. Although no expressed plan was formulated,
the recommendation was that the individual county assignment judges be allowed to
formulate the system best suited for their own needs.
2. Settlement Conferences. After a certain period of time has elapsed (9 months), a
mandatory settlement conference would be held to determine the probable value of the
case. At this conference, the judge would file a Certificate of Approximate Value with the
court.
3. In all matters wherein the Certificate of Approximate Value shows a value of
$5,000 or less, arbitration shall be required. Arbitrators shall consist of panels of two
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In any event, it appears that any no-fault plan which uses calendar
congestion as its cornerstone rests on a somewhat weak foundation.
Unreliability of Fault Determinations
Professors Keeton and O'Connell, the present spokesmen for the
no-fault concept, maintain that in the vast majority of automobile
accident cases, no one is at fault; these accidents are, instead, the result
of inevitable and invisible forces beyond human control. 10 3 In an illreasoned effort to discount the significance of fault in an automobile
accident, advocates of no-fault liken the investigation of accidents to
the epidemiology of infectious diseases.10 4 The conclusion reached is
that since fault is irrelevant in determining compensation for victims of
disease, so then must fault be irrelevant in determining the compensation of automobile accident victims.
Many other critics of the fault concept, while not approaching
the radical position of Professors Keeton and O'Connell, maintain that
it is almost impossible for any juror to make a rational allocation of
the responsibility for an accident. This school of thought, while recognizing that fault is involved in the accident, invokes the inability of the
average juror to determine culpability as the stumbling block of the
fault system:
The operator must observe the operation of other vehicles, front
and rear and to the sides-those he is meeting, those that pass, and
those that may cross his path. He must observe road signs, stop
signs, cautions, traffic lines, light signals and those of traffic officers.
He must observe his speed and that of others. He must watch for
signals of other motorists and give proper signals himself. He must
know the operating mechanisms of his machine, check their operations as he travels, and maintain his rapidly moving and complex
machine under control at all times. These and other duties may be
required of him every moment of his travel ....
Multiply the same duties and hazards by any number of other
operators in the immediate vicinity; add the duties and hazards
members of the bar each chosen by computer from a list propounded by the assignment
judge. Either party shall have the right of appeal by way of a de novo trial.
4. Recovery of Costs. If, after a trial, a plaintiff shall receive a jury award of 120%
of the arbitration figure, then he shall be liable for no costs. Likewise, if the defendant
shall appeal and the plaintiff shall receive less than 80% of the arbitration figure, or a
no-cause, then he shall not be liable for costs.
5. The committee also recommended that N.J.R. 4:38-2 (1972) be amended so that
there shall be bifurcated trials on the issues of liability and damages in all instances
except products liability and professional malpractice cases. Id. at 3-6, 11-12, 19-20.
103 Keeton, Is There a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law? 53 VA. L. REv. 886,
890 (1967).
104 O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 299, 321-24 (1963).
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of highway maintenance, passengers, pedestrians, and adjacent
landowners, the conduct of any one or more of whom may impose
upon all operators in close proximity duties and hazards requiring
instant and perhaps unerring judgment and action. Add further
the hazards of climatic conditions; the imperfections of the human
being in sight, judgment, muscular reaction, health, strength, and
experience. Bring any combination of these duties and hazards into
focus on a collision at high speed at a particular point of time and
place. Who can name all the factors involved in causing the collision? Who can know or discover or describe the conduct of the
parties involved? Who in retrospect from the tangled fragments of
evidence given by the participants or bystanders and those who
arrived on the scene at a later time; from marks and measurements,
calculations of time and speed, is expert enough to reconstruct the
fleeting scene with any assurance of its accuracy. If the picture
by some miracle could be truly presented, who could pass a rational
judgment in the allocation of responsibility as between the parties
on any basis of fault?105
While this account is somewhat supposititious, a large insurance
company's recent survey of its operations in the automobile accident
field reached a different conclusion.10 6 The company took a random
sampling of 352 of its total automobile accident claims. In 25 such
cases the policyholder struck a stationary object other than a parked
car. In 64 cases one of the parties struck a parked car. In 79 cases one
of the parties struck the other vehicle in the rear. Of the 78 intersection
cases, fault was clear in 38, could be assigned as a probability in 29, while
a mere 11 were questionable. Fourteen cases involved sideswipe accidents of which only three entailed fault not clearly attributable to one
of the parties. 10 7 The summary of the 352 cases surveyed by the company
1 08
showed:
Policyholder dearly at fault
Claimant dearly at fault
Fault questionable

201
125
26

57.1%
35.5%
7.4%

A similar survey of personal injury actions involving more complex
accidents and more serious injuries revealed similar ratios of ascertainable fault to questionable fault. Of the 106 cases taken randomly from
the New Jersey claims office, the following statistics were compiled: 109
L. GREEN, TRAFIc VIcIMs: TORT LAW AND INSURANcE, 66-68 (1958).
106 Marryott, Testing the Criticisms of the Fault Concept, 35 INS. COUNSEL
(1968).
107 Id. at 114.
108 Id. at 115.
105

109 Id.

J.

112
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Policyholder clearly at fault
Claimant clearly at fault
Fault questionable

77
19
10
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72.6%
18.0%
9.4%

These statistics, while diametrically opposed to the aforementioned
theory, clearly indicate a basic premise: accidents are caused by careless
conduct, drunken drivers, defective vehicles and poorly designed highways. For those accident cases where fault determination is not so
readily ascertainable, ever-improving scientific technology and expert
application of the principles of physics and engineering will, as they
have in the past, be of assistance to the jury in its search for the root
cause of the accident. 11 0 The proposition that the tort system should
be abolished because fault, although it does exist, cannot be easily
ascertained is a circuitous one. The very recognition of fault implies
an allocation of responsibility, at least in a comparative sense.
Public policy would not require the elimination of the automobile
negligence case from the traditional jury determination where less than
10 percent of the cases are of the questionable fault variety. Indeed,
the entire judicial process was established to provide a forum for thosecases where a controversy exists.
Cost of Administering the System
When analyzing the cost of automobile insurance, the consideration
of price in relation to quality is as valid as it is in any other consumer
field. Proponents of no-fault allege, however, that:
[I]nsurance costs are too high, that injured people receive too
small a proportion of the premium dollar, that the costs of administering the present system are too high, that the fees paid by injured persons to their attorneys are excessive and that the usual
arrangement, the contingent fee, leads to undesirable practices."'
When these allegations are analyzed in depth, their vulnerability to
the forces of fact and reason becomes apparent. Recent statistics indicate
that insurance costs are not exorbitant. One source gives the national
average cost of a $10,000/$20,000/$5,000 liability policy at $79.64.112
The figures surveyed included a low of $33.01 in South Dakota and
a high of $129.92 in Massachusetts.I' In terms of the cost of other
types of coverage, such as hospital insurance, these figures are not
110 See Lawton, Automobile Insurance Law-An Engineering Appraisal, 36 INS.
J. 347, 349 (1969).

COUNSEL

111 ABA, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CoMMrEE ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS

105 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
112 UNITED STATES NEWS & WORLD REPORT,

11s Id. at 7.

July 8, 1968, at 10.
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excessive. Further study also indicates that, contrary to popular opinion,
automobile insurance rates are decreasing, and that major insurance
underwriters are reaping higher profits. State Farm Mutual Insurance
Company has reported that it will pay more than $30 million to its
automobile policyholders in the form of dividends.11 4 In 1971, profits
of the Kemper Insurance Company tripled, 115 while the Harley Mutual
Insurance Company followed the previous year's loss with a profit of $1
million. 116 Profits such as these do not reflect a situation where governmental intervention is necessary.
But even assuming that this profit picture is only of short duration,
what does no-fault offer the motoring public in the way of continuing
7
savings? Bill 2302 would require a mandatory rate cut of 25 percent.'
This decrease will apply only to liability policies. The premiums for
the newly created first-party coverage, which includes medical expense
and wage continuation payments, have not been disclosed; neither
have the drafters of Bill 2302 placed a ceiling upon these rates. It is
clear, however, that this premium will be added to the liability endorsement premium. Moreover, Bill 2423 makes absolutely no provision for
rate decreases or control.
The contingent fee argument, while controversial, is all but moot
today in New Jersey. The Supreme Court, by and through its rulemaking powers, has issued a comprehensive contingent fee schedule
114 94 N.J.L.J. 827 (1971). State Farm Insurance Company indicated that the dividends
would be paid to those policyholders from the following states where profits were excessive: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. The
dividend will range from 1% to 17% of the premium dollar. Note must be made of the
inclusion of urban states: Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, California, New York and Delaware.
Id.
115 TRLAzL, Sept.-Oct., 1971, at 10.
116 Id.
117 Bill 2302, § 8a. While the Bill anticipates a rate decrease, some evidence exists
which may place such claims in doubt. In Massachusetts there was a required 15% rate
decrease, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 13B (Supp. 1971). A recent survey of participating
motorists, however, illustrates that this decrease did not occur. When asked what effect
no-fault had on their insurance rates, the motorists answered as follows:

1
2
3
4
ATLA,

Went Up
Went Down
Stayed the Same
Don't Know

28%
6
44
22

REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF No-FAULT OPINION RESEARCH POLL,. . . IN

BamF 2 (1972).
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which limits the amounts charged by attorneys for negligence cases.""
Even assuming, however, that the fee schedule was not promulgated,
the issue remains a debatable one.
Whether attorneys' fees absorb a large portion of the insurance
premium dollar has been, is, and will continue to be the subject of
much speculation. Proponents of no-fault contend that the figure
approaches $.23 of the premium dollar, 119 while opponents indicate
that the figure more closely approaches $.05.120 Only in depth studies,
by nonpartisan experts, will reveal the true cost of such legal services.
The argument over attorneys' fees would probably be given little
weight by courts and legislatures if it could be conclusively demonstrated
that lawyers were of little practical value to the victims of automobile
accidents. However, even Professor O'Connell, one of the most staunch
advocates of no-fault, admits that the accident victim who retains the
services of an attorney receives greater awards, even after attorneys'
1 21
fees are subtracted, than he would have received had he not done so.

No-fault will take this advantage away from the accident victim.
Inequities of Compensation
The major premise upon which the tort system is grounded has
been that the innocent victim of another's negligent conduct must be
made whole; he must be fully compensated for the injuries sustained.
This consideration must necessarily leave the culpable party to bear
the burden of his own negligent conduct. No-fault would seek to change
this basic concept. It would reduce the compensation of the innocent
party and allocate the savings to the heretofore uncompensated individual responsible for the loss.
118 N.J.R. 1:21-7 (c) (1972) provides:
In any matter where a client's claim for damages is based upon the alleged
tortious conduct of another, including products liability claims . . . an attorney
shall not contract for, charge, or collect a contingent fee in excess of the following
limits:
(1) 50% on the first $1,000 recovered;
(2) 40% on the next $2,000 recovered;
(3) 3 3-V3% on the next $47,000 recovered;
(4) 20% on the next $50,000 recovered;
(5) 10% on any amount recovered over $100,000; and
(6) where the amount recovered is for the benefit of an infant or incompetent
and the matter is settled without trial the foregoing limits shall apply, except
that the fee on any amount recovered up to $50,000 shall not exceed 25%.
119 DOT REPORT at 52. This figure includes claims administration costs plus defense
and plaintiff's attorney costs.
120 ABA REPORT, supra note 115, at 119.
121

J.

49 (1971).

O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND

THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT
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A few jurisdictions have accomplished this aim while retaining the
122
tort system through the implementation of comparative negligence.
This theory antedates the defense of contributory negligence and
functions by apportioning the damages between the parties based upon
their respective fault. 123 New Jersey in recent years has attempted to
introduce such a plan, but to no avail. 2 4 The most notable attribute
of this concept is that the individual who has been guilty of minor
negligent conduct will not go uncompensated; his recovery will be in
direct proportion to his culpability in causing the accident. 125 The
comparative negligence concept cannot be considered a panacea for the
existing problems of the fault system, but it does represent an eminently
practical and equitable solution to one of those difficulties: the inequities arising from the contributory negligence rule.
Another related criticism of the fault system is twofold in nature:
(1) both parties must await the determination of a tort action to be
compensated for their expenses incidental to the accident; and (2)
even the party at fault should be compensated for such costs. This
problem, however, is also not without solution under the present fault
system. One method of protecting the economic interests of the nation's motorists from the crippling effects of accidents, regardless of
fault, is to append mandatory "med pay" policy provisions to existing
financial responsibility laws. 1 26 The cost is minimal, the theory the
same as the first-party no-fault coverage, but the tort system and its
concurrent full compensation principles would remain. One major
insurance carrier has announced that it will market an additional policy endorsement which will include wage continuation of $6,140 per
year, medical expense reimbursement of $2,500, and funeral expenses
up to $1,000 for a cost of approximately $5 per year. 127 In addition, if
122 See, e.g., ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507:7-a (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958).
123 Evidence of the use of comparative negligence dates from the thirteenth century.
A. MARSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA 136 (10th ed. 1953). See Heft & Heft, Comparative Negligence: Wisconsin's Answer, 55 A.B.A.J. 127 (1969). Dean Prosser characterizes the United
States as the last stronghold of the common law defense of contributory negligence. Prosser,
Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 466 (1953).
124 See Comment, Comparative Negligence: An Opportunity for New Jersey, 1 SzrON
HALL L. Rav. 87, n.3 (1970).
125 An example will serve to illustrate. Plaintiff is found 20% negligent and defendant
80% negligent. If the plaintiff suffered damages of $1,000 he could collect $800 from the
defendant. For a discussion of Wisconsin's comparative negligence system, see Heft & Heft,
supra note 123, at 128-29.
126 Medical Payments is a policy endorsement which a motorist may purchase from
his own liability insurance carrier. It will provide a stipulated sum for medical expenses
if the insured is injured in an accident. Such coverage operates regardless of fault.
127 TRIAL, Nov.-Dec., 1971, at 9.
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national health care becomes a reality, no citizen will be saddled with
medical expenses while awaiting the outcome of a negligence suit for
the compensation of other damages. Even today, the chances that a
negligent party will be without means to cover the necessary expenses
incidental to an accident are less than at any previous time.
Another area which has presented problems for the innocent accident victim is the uncollectibility of judgments. This result occurs
when the defendant has no insurance or assets to cover the excess judgment, or has been granted immunity from suit or limited liability. In
New Jersey today, the traffic accident victim must receive at least $10,000
for his injuries, assuming, of course, that this sum represents the reasonable value of his injuries. 128 But even in this State, drastic revision
of the financial responsibility laws is essential to keep pace with the
upward surge in the standard of living. Another necessity, already underway, is the abolition of the various immunities which still prevent
many victims from recovering for injuries sustained. 129
128 In New Jersey, today, an innocent traffic victim can collect at least $10,000 from:
(1) the defendant's insurance company, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-46 (Supp. 1971-72); (2) the
uninsured motorist fund, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-69 (1961); or (3) from his own insurance
under the uninsured motorist policy endorsement required by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1
(1970).
129 The supreme court in Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970), dispensed with the doctrine of interspousal immunity. In grounding its decision on the
change in public need, the court stated:
In a day when automobile accidents are unfortunately becoming so frequent
and the injuries suffered by the passengers are often so severe, it seems unjust
to deny the claims of the many because of the potentiality for fraud by the few.
Moreover, there is something wanting in a system of justice which permits
strangers, friends, relatives, and emancipated children to recover for injuries
suffered as a result of their driver's negligence but denies this right to the driver's
spouse and minor children who are also passengers in the same vehicle.
Id. at 495, 267 A.2d at 488.
In France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970), the court abolished
the parent-child immunity concept. In noting that some fraud or collusion might well
exist in any claims presented by a child against his parent, the court stated:
Even assuming that a few fraudulent and collusive claims will slip through judges
and juries (and there is no empirical evidence that the assumption is valid), we
believe that this price would not be too great since the alternative is to continue
a prophylactic rule which indiscriminately bars all claims. We do not believe that
the judiciary should continue to refuse to hear an entire class of actions simply
because some of these claims may be the product of venality.
Id. at 505, 267 A.2d at 493.
In Willis v. Department of Cons. & Ec. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970), the court
ostensibly extended the chipping away process of previous decisions in the area of
sovereign immunity. While the court acknowledged that the defense of sovereign immunity in tort cases was outmoded, it fell short of complete abrogation. Certain limitations
were carefully delineated:
T]he State will not be held liable for legislative or judicial action or inaction,
or administrative action or inaction of a legislative or judicial cast, nor generally
with respect to decisions calling for the exercise of official judgment or discretion.

1972]

COMMENTS

The plight of the accident victim is not caused by the inability of
the tort system to function, but rather by the legislative and judicial
failure to keep pace with changing economic conditions, and until such
time as appropriate legislation is enacted, the accident victim, with
or without no-fault, will continue to suffer extreme hardship.
CONCLUSION

The plans have been drafted, opinions expressed, and battle lines
drawn. The war has been waged on the floors of legislatures and
throughout the vast network of mass media. No one can argue that
problems do not exist in the accident-reparations system. No one will
contend that change is unnecessary. However the methodology of
implementing such change is not only crucial to the solution of these
problems, but to the cause of the controversy itself. At best, the New
Jersey proposals are "second-rate" pieces of legislation which seem
inadequate to meet the real needs of this State's citizens. To hope that
in their implementation a quality service will somehow emerge is
wishful thinking-for nothing that is wrong in theory can be right in
practice.
In the final analysis, however, our courts will be called upon to
make the determination of constitutionality. It is they who must decide
whether the legislature has overstepped the bounds of reasonableness
in advancing and adopting this program. The disparate results which
can occur through judicial consideration of the problem are illustrated
by the holdings in Pinnick and Grace v. Howlett.130 One cannot help
but wonder how much effect legislative zeal has upon judicial objectivity. No-fault certainly seems capable of generating this sort of influence. Yet, awareness of a difficulty is the first step toward dealing
with it. As the court in Grace stated:
At the outset the Court expresses its wholehearted approval of
the salutary and worthwhile purposes of the legislature in attempting to alleviate court congestion, afford speedy recovery and reduce
insurance rates. The wisdom and desirability of the motives of
the legislature, however, do not determine the constitutionality
of an enactment.' 3 1
on J. Auty
Id. at 540, 264 A.2d at 37. While the Willis decision has not encompassed all actions of the
sovereign or its agents, such as county and municipal organizations, it definitely opened
the area of tort litigation to claimants heretofore barred from relief.
180 Grace v. Howlett, Civil No. 4737-71 (Ill. Ch., Dec. 29, 1971), aff'd, Civil No.
44902-72 (Ill. Sup. Ct., Apr. 17, 1972).
181 Id.
0 As this Comment goes to print the New Jersey Legislature has passed no-fault insurance, N.J. Assembly Bill A-667, May 19, 1972.

